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CLOSING THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP 




The opposing economic philosophies of 
capitalism and communism collided on October 
3, 1990, with the official economic and mone-
tary unification of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West) and the German Democratic 
Republic (East). The effects since then have 
included crises of unemployment, mass plant 
closings, enormous transfer payments, and pes-
simism in the recently-unified Germany. 
Addressing the economic problems which 
Germany has faced since its reunification is a 
complicated task involving numerous econom-
ic and political factors. Some of these include 
the effects of the rapid privatization of the East 
German economy, the revaluation of the East 
German currency to the level of the strong West 
German deutsche mark, and the wage parity 
which has forced companies operating in East 
Germany to pay inflated West German wages to 
the less skilled, undereducated, and compara-
tively inefficient East German workers. But to 
fully understand the current German econom-
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ic crisis it is critical to examine the productiv-
ity differences between the East and the West. 
The unification of Germany has fused two 
completely dissimilar economic and political 
systems with different abilities to produce. 
West Germany was a nation of well-educated 
workers in a capitalist system which fostered 
industrial growth and provided enormous 
incentives to achieve high levels of quality and 
efficiency. Within a couple of decades, West 
Germany had become one of the strongest eco-
nomic powers in the world, and it had earned a 
reputation for reliable products and state-of-
the-art technology. Meanwhile, the formerly 
productive and highly-skilled workforce of East 
Germany had been burdened under socialism 
with restrictions, bureaucracy, and an inability 
to access Western technology and markets. The 
requirement under the communist regime to 
achieve a fully-employed labor force forced 
firms to hire more people than were needed, 
which heightened bureaucracy and decreased 
efficiency. The restrictions of the East German 
government severely limited the ability of firms 
to replace obsolete machinery and to conduct 
research and development. Thus , East Ger-
many's economic growth, while favorable 
among the Eastern Bloc nations, was low com-
pared to those of Western economies. 
Since unification, the merger of these 
economies has brought unemployment and 
business closures. One reason was the privati-
zation of East German firms by the Treuhand 
agency. This bureau was created by the German 
government to find investors for East German 
firms previously owned by the state. The 
Treuhand was able to sell nearly all of these 
companies, but the process cost millions of jobs 
and billions of marks. In general, neither these 
firms nor their workers had been able to com-
pete with their counterparts in the West. 
In this essay, I analyze the causes of the 
productivity gap between East and West 
Germany. I also show recent progress and pre-
sent trends with an emphasis on what has been 
done to bring the industrial base and the econ-
omy of the East up to the level of the West. 
Although the problem is far from being 
resolved, it is important to examine what goals 
the government has set, the solutions that have 
been proposed, and what the outlook is for the 
future of German productivity. 
Perceptions of German Industry 
Until recently, in most of the Western 
world German industry has been thought of as 
synonymous with the West German capitalist 
industry of the last fifty years. Indeed, the for-
mer Federal Republic of Germany built a repu-
tation for being the model of education and 
skills-training with grand scientific facilities, a 
high research and development commitment, 
and a strong export-minded array of medium-
sized companies known as Mittelstand. 
(Templeman et al. , p. 66) Its economy grew 
steadily after the end of World War II and into 
the 1980s, despite strict anti-inflationary eco-
nomic policies. West Germany has traditional-
ly had the world 's strongest currency, and in 
1994 held an $81 billion trade surplus, with most 
exports going to Western Europe and about 8 
percent to the United States. West Germany has 
also been known for its labor laws and strong 
unions which protect the standard of living. Its 
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people have enjoyed one of the world's highest 
average wage levels, shortest work weeks, and 
longest vacations. Germany's social welfare sys-
tem (health care, retirement pensions, and child 
care) has also been considered to be among the 
world's best. (Conwell, p. B1) 
East Germany had likewise been an eco-
nomic powerhouse. With the strongest econo-
my of the Eastern Bloc countries, it enjoyed 
nearly full employment and was considered by 
many to be history's most successful socialist 
state. Again and again its leaders would refine 
its "planning mechanism" (a kind of economic 
constitution which defines the distribution of 
resources and revenue) to restrengthen the sys-
tem upon encountering economic obstacles. 
(Bryson, p. 22) It had all the benefits of a 
skilled, low-cost workforce which was produc-
ing efficiently enough to satisfy the steady 
demand of the Soviet market. 
Productivity 
Productivity is a vague and often misun-
derstood term. Its measurement can be even 
more confusing since there is no single stan-
dard method or unit to consistently define it. 
In general, however, it is the ability to produce 
goods or provide services effectively. It is the 
economic value created from a conversion of 
resources - labor, energy, materials, and cap-
ital. This often means the quantity of products 
and services or gross tonnage of output per 
employee or per man-hour. It may also include 
the value added by a process or firm. Thus, the 
focuses of productivity are throughput, effi-
ciency, and value added. Although various mea-
surement methods may weigh these compo-
nents differently, increases in any of these 
factors are thought to have a positive influence 
on productivity. 
Defining productivity as an overall level of 
efficient production is much less difficult than 
trying to measure it accurately. Often a mea-
sure of physical productivity is used, which is 
defined as the output per employee. However, 
this does not include the complexity of the 
item, the costs of production, the age of the 
equipment, the skill level of the workers, the 
degree to which automation is used to replace 
some employees, and the number of employees 
a firm has who are not direct producers, such 
as staff, supervisors, or researchers. Economic 
productivity deals more with sales per employ-
ee in currency units, or the value added per 
employee. (Carr pp. 80-84) It is important to 
note that none of these measures includes any 
direct consideration of quality, whether sub-
jective (such as customer satisfaction) or quan-
titative (such as the number of defects per one 
thousand units). 
Thus, a universal index of productivity as a 
standard to which all producers can relate their 
processes does not exist. Despite this, one will 
often see comparisons such as "Country A was 
40 percent more productive than Country B." 
This does not necessarily mean that workers gen-
erally work harder in Country A, or that plants 
and factories in Country B are not operating as 
efficiently as they could. Country B might not 
have sufficient natural resources, so its input 
costs are higher. Also, its firms may focus more 
on quality than throughput; or maybe demand 
is less in Country B so its sales are lower. 
These are precisely the types of problems 
which arise with comparisons of productivity 
for different industries in different locations. 
But manufacturers, engineers, and business-
men who study this subject seem to feel that, if 
one collects enough data on as many different 
variables that can be enumerated and combines 
them all in some complex way, one just might 
be able to figure out how efficient one compa-
ny, industry, or economy is in comparison to 
another. Such comparisons will be given for dif-
ferences among the production capabilities of 
East and West German firms in this essay. But 
readers should keep in mind that it is important 
not to concentrate on the precise quantitative 
differences, but rather on their causes. 
Productivity in Germany before 
Unification 
West Germany 
West Germany's rapid, post-war recovery 
during the 1950s and 60s was known as the 
Wirtschaftswunder or "economic miracle. " 
During the first forty years after World War II, 
West Germany's commitment to state-of-the-
art technology and research and development 
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helped propel it to the ranks of the top three 
world economies. 
Over the course of the last ten years, how-
ever, German productivity and technology has 
slipped somewhat. An apparent aversion to risk 
has deterred investment in new areas and has 
caused much of its industrial base to cling to 
traditionally successful industries such as met-
als, chemicals, motors, and machinery, instead 
of nurturing investment in new high-technol-
ogy fields such as microelectronics, biotech-
nology, computer software, and genetic engi-
neering. (Fisher, p. 9) West Germany has also 
exhibited less technological innovation recent-
ly, as shown by the comparatively low number 
of patents issued over the last ten years. There 
seems to be less incentive for such advance-
ments not only in Germany, but in Europe as a 
whole. Some of this may be attributed to reg-
ulations which promote domestic markets, such 
as those that help protect European automak-
ers from Japanese and American competition. 
Despite these deficiencies, West German 
industry has devoted much of its expertise into 
improving its traditional competitive strengths. 
One such effort has been to ensure that its 
management and workforce are the best-
trained and most highly educated in the world. 
Of German production managers, about 60 per-
cent have either advanced degrees or degrees 
in business, and 20 percent have doctorates, a 
level usually thought to be more common to 
researchers and educators. (Carr, p. 83) Most 
medium and large companies provide in-house 
training and education. Workers whose role in 
production may be limited to a few responsi-
bilities are given training in functions outside 
of their immediate duties, such as quality con-
trol, management techniques, manufacturing 
strategies, and theoretical studies to couple 
with their practical knowledge. This leads to 
more flexible workers who are able to make 
decisions and are conscious of their .r·oles in 
production and in the success of the company. 
East Germany 
Prior to unification the East German pro-
ductive base largely consisted of manufactur-
ing, and this was generally centered around low 
technology products. Like West Germany, it 
devoted much of its manufacturing resources 
to classic engineering industries such as met-
als, chemicals, and vehicles. These comprised 
eighteen percent of East German manufactur-
ing, compared to thirty-one percent for the 
West. But unlike West Germany, where wages 
were too high to support labor-intensive pro-
duction, East Germany focused on the lowest 
technology areas such as food, woodworking, 
and textiles. Service industries such as law, 
tourism, retail sales, media, accounting, con-
sulting, and banking were not valued under the 
socialist economy. However, the need for busi-
ness services quickly became apparent as the 
state collapsed and the unification process 
began. There was a severe lack of technologi-
cal advancement, mainly the result of a research 
and development spending level which was only 
about 20 percent that of West Germany. This 
resulted, for example, in the West having a 67:1 
advantage over the East in the number of 
patents per million people from 1963-87. 
(Hitchens, p. 103) 
Despite the lack of business services, inno-
vation, and contact with western companies, 
East German industry experienced the benefit of 
having the consistent, scheduled demand of the 
Soviet Union and its satellite states for its prod-
ucts. This meant that East German firms could 
devote more of their resources to production 
rather than inventory storage, marketing, and 
sales. But instead of being able to take advan-
tage of this opportunity to lower costs and 
increase productivity, East German companies 
had to deal with the typical bureaucracy of a 
communist state. For example, when 10,000 pri-
vately-owned East German companies were 
taken over by the state in 1972, politicians and 
friends of the regime were rewarded by the gov-
ernment with the opportunities to run these 
firms. The state then added to the payroll other 
politicians, spouses of Soviet military officials, 
officers of the secret police, and anyone who 
would raise the employment figures so it would 
appear that the system was working. The pres-
ence of such unproductive people coupled with 
total job security often discouraged the other 
workers from being efficient. Manufacturing 
thus became less efficient in East Germany while 
labor costs rose dramatically. (Bryson, pp. 52-54) 
The East German system of corporate 
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investment and the upgrading of facilities also 
severely limited productivity. Investment 
expenditures were decided by the government, 
which allocated funds based on the importance 
of the product. To enhance the "image" of East 
German manufacturing, the government stip-
ulated that a certain number of processes had 
to be automated, whether automation was a jus-
tified expense or not. Receiving funds required 
a lengthy process with extensive documenta-
tion because the investment had to fit within 
the government's order of planning. This was 
a set of national economic strategies which stip-
ulated how the East German industrial base 
would strike the proper balance between five 
production needs: energy, materials and other 
inputs, equipment, consumer goods, and indus-
trial plants. (Bryson, pp. 39-40) When invest-
ment funds were provided, machines and equip-
ment were generally purchased from suppliers 
in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and were 
often secondhand. At the time of unification, 
only 50 percent of the machines in East 
Germany were less than five years old, com-
pared to 71 percent in the West. Moreover the 
technology on which the equipment was based 
was generally about twenty years behind that of 
Western counterparts. In the West, 85 percent 
of this machinery would have been considered 
inferior. It was not so much the legal restric-
tions that prevented the purchase of modern 
Western equipment, but the lack of the neces-
sary foreign currency. 
The result of these differences in equip-
ment quality frequently led to large-scale efforts 
on the part of the CDR to update and modify 
existing equipment. But this resulted in main-
tenance costs which were twice as high as those 
incurred by West German industries, and these 
more than offset any increases in productivity. 
Even with these efforts, insufficient mainte-
nance and low operator skill often led to break-
downs not caused by machine depreciation. 
East Germany's low productivity actually 
helped accelerate the decline of the socialist 
economy. The East German state created tight 
production and delivery schedules. But unlike 
the just-in-time methods so often used by busi-
nesses today, East German firms generally 
could not choose their suppliers, especially 
international ones. Thus, when a harsh winter 
drained energy supplies and caused trans-
portation difficulties in 1987, it set off a chain 
reaction of production deficiencies. Firms did 
not keep adequate inventory, and those which 
were still able to produce did not have the flex-
ibility, the equipment, or the incentive to raise 
productivity to meet the increased demand that 
other companies were unable to fulfill. By 
1988, the government refocused its investments 
on consumer goods instead of capital goods to 
quell some of the shortages. Because of this, 
companies were unable to replace obsolete 
machines and productivity hit "rock bottom" in 
1989. (Bryson, pp. 23-27) When the Berlin Wall 
fell later that year, the rallying cry was not "pro-
ductivity," but it is common historical knowl-
edge that a political regime's strength is strong-
ly dependent upon its economic viability. 
The Post-Unification Era and the 
Present Situation 
The Results of Privatization 
At the time of monetary union and the 
revaluation of the East German mark, physical 
productivity, or output per employee, in the 
East was about 50 percent that of the West. 
Moreover, the value added per head was only 
about one-third for firms making items com-
parable to those of their counterparts in the 
West. Because it shows how much a finished 
product is worth compared to its inputs, value-
added productivity measurements give a better 
idea of what customers view as the worth of the 
product, and therefore its quality. Immediately 
after unification, this difference in productivity 
was not viewed as serious because West German 
investors viewed the East Germans as general-
ly well-educated workers who could still be paid 
wages considerably lower than those in the 
West. Entrepreneurs also assumed that because 
the East German currency was exchanged on a 
one-to-one basis with the deutschemark, East 
Germans would have money to spend in their 
new economy. It was also thought that pro-
ductivity would slowly rise to the level of the 
West, and wages would rise proportionately. 
But soon after the monetary union, the German 
government promised to boost East German 
wages and salaries to those in the West. This 
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resulted in East German wage costs rivaling 
those in the U.S., but with a GDP per person on 
a par with that of Mexico. (Hitchens) Obviously, 
investors would not have been attracted to such 
a situation, so it was up to the Treuhand to pro-
vide incentives and support to investors to 
encourage them to purchase the nearly 13,781 
firms which it inherited. 
Some of the incentives provided by the 
Treuhand agency included selling land for vir-
tually nothing, shouldering the former busi-
nesses' debts, assuming the cost of environ-
mental cleanups, and sometimes even covering 
early losses. The strategy of the privatization 
process could be described as: "Pick up restruc-
turing costs and add some investment, in 
exchange for firm commitments on jobs, and 
future investment by the new owners." 
(Gumbel, p. A1) As a result of this strategy, only 
60 companies remained unsold at the end of the 
process. By December 31, 1994, when 
Treuhand ceased to exist after completing the 
task of privatizing Eastern companies, it had 
lost $173 billion, and almost two-thirds of the 
East German workers had become unemployed 
during the restructuring process. Most men 
over age 50 probably will not work again. 
Employment of working-age women in East 
Germany fell by nearly 40 percent while 80 per-
cent of industrial jobs were lost. To cover the 
costs of the Treuhand and the transfer payments 
to the East, West Germans have paid a 7.5 per-
cent surcharge on all personal and corporate 
income taxes. 
The rapid sale of East German companies 
provided opportunities to investors who were 
either entrepreneurial risks or who were looking 
to take advantage of the situation. This chaotic 
period of German economic history did not allow 
for the Treuhand to conduct proper investigations 
of potential investors or of the conflicting own-
ership claims on the property which was seized 
up to fifty years ago by the GDR. (Eisenhammer, 
p. 36) Despite the incentives given by the 
Treuhand, the support of the German govern-
ment, and the eagerness of workers and investors 
alike to bring success to the newly capitalist 
enterprises, many of the privatized businesses 
quickly failed. Mismanagement by the new own-
ers was one reason for the closing of many busi-
nesses. In adapting to capitalism, East German 
firms have also had to deal with out-of-date tech-
niques and an oversupply of their products in 
Western markets. Many firms have also found it 
difficult to adapt to new design and quality stan-
dards and to incorporate the competition-driven 
elements of marketing, advertising, and user-
friendliness to their businesses. 
Adding to the East German inefficiency 
problems, there has also been a lack of worker 
motivation in some firms. The lower skill and 
educational levels of East Germans has caused 
many to be demoted, in order to align their 
skills with those of better-educated West 
German workers. Other factors contributing 
to low motivation have been low production 
and sales levels and a skepticism regarding the 
ability of the plant to close the gap with Western 
competitors. Recently, however, motivation 
seems to be on the rise in many firms, because 
those who have jobs see possible unemploy-
ment as strong motivation to work harder and 
many now view their company as able to sur-
vive. (Hitchens, p. 58) 
Strengths and Weaknesses of East 
German Firms 
The East German workforce does have cer-
tain competitive strengths which both investors 
and the German government hope will provide 
the base upon which a strong economy may 
eventually be built. It will not become com-
pletely apparent what these strengths are until 
one can look back on this time period and see 
which firms survived and which ones did not. 
However, an evaluation can still be made about 
the assets of the newly market-oriented econo-
my. For one thing, East Germans have a good 
skill base in the classic engineering trades such 
as welding, drilling, machine maintenance, 
woodworking, and milling. They also have 
knowledge of and connections with Eastern 
European and former Soviet economies. 
(Hitchens, pp. 109-10) While these are not cur-
rently the strongest of markets, they are expect-
ed to eventually become the next high-growth 
area after the Asia-Pacific region, and East 
Germany is hoping to grow with them. Of the 
former Soviet satellites, East Germany appears 
to be the first to successfully make the transi-
tion to a market system. This, no doubt, can be 
92 
attributed mainly to its previous success under 
socialism, and to its unification with the eco-
nomically successful West Germany. 
Because East Germany has not yet raised 
its industrial capabilities to those of West 
Germany, it is important to analyze its many 
weaknesses as well. While its close ties to 
Eastern Europe and Russia are expected to be 
an asset of East Germany, the fall of commu-
nism in those states has also removed East 
Germany's largest market. The socialist econ-
omy left East German industries with a repu-
tation for producing low quality products. 
Despite East German workers ' skills in tradi-
tional trades, they lack expertise in important 
fields such as new materials, hydraulics, and 
electronics. Without having had available the 
support of business services, many East German 
firms also need to improve their management 
skills, particularly in areas such as data proces-
sing, organization, accounting, communication 
and marketing. 
Another significant obstacle for East 
German firms has been an insufficient infra-
structure. These problems are now disappear-
ing due to the enormous amount of construc-
tion taking place throughout Eastern Germany 
to improve the general state of its roads and 
utilities. The government has provided so 
many incentives to real estate investors that 
there are now actually large surpluses of office 
space in most East German cities. (Miller, p. 54) 
The concern over the shortage of business serv-
ice personnel , such as bankers , lawyers , 
accountants, and marketing consultants, is 
being addressed by an influx of Western com-
panies seeking to get a foothold in the market 
before East German entrepreneurs learn to pro-
vide these services themselves. There still 
remain problems regarding plants and facto-
ries, however. The size of most greatly exceeds 
what is needed for current capacity. Many are 
old and in some state of disrepair, with 55 per-
cent predating World War II. From the recent 
socialist days of scheduled production and low 
capital investment, there remains a lack of 
warehouse space for inventory but enormous 
stockpiles of old machines and loose parts . 
(Hitchens, pp. 69-71) 
From this assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of East German businesses, we can 
point to the characteristics of those enterpris-
es most likely to survive and be successful. The 
business needed to have produced a robust 
product prior to unification. The plant and 
workforce should be flexible enough to adapt to 
the production of a different or better product. 
The firm should have investors from, or at least 
strong ties with, counterparts in West Germany 
who can provide advice on matters such as 
manufacturing and marketing. There also 
needs to be strong commitment to plant and 
machinery investment, worker training, 
research, and product development. 
Mter these businesses survive the period of 
uncertainty in East Germany, they must then be 
able to withstand the same problems that West 
German companies now face. These include 
supporting the world's most costly welfare state, 
cleaning up the environment, dealing with 
increasing continental and global competition, 
and challenging the powerful labor unions. 
Relief Efforts 
To improve the East German infrastruc-
ture and to raise the level of employment simul-
taneously, the German government has estab-
lished New-Deal-type job opportunities for 
unemployed East Germans. Some of the $500 
million raised by new taxes (Cowell, p. B1) in 
West Germany has been used to employ many 
of them to pave roads, build shopping centers, 
and open banks. (Melloan, p. A13) In 1994 East 
Germany devoted three times more of its gross 
domestic product to construction than the 
West, while manufacturing accounted for only 
19 percent of the East's GOP as opposed to 28 
percent of the West's. (Miller, p. 54) Such dif-
ferences could be a source of concern for peo-
ple who feel that temporary, government-spon-
sored jobs bloat employment and revenue 
statistics and thus hide the severity of the eco-
nomic problems still facing the East. The 
German government, however, feels confident 
that these measures are needed to allow the 
new East German enterprises a chance to estab-
lish themselves and become profitable. 
Many investors and companies have found 
that establishing a strong presence in Eastern 
Germany should be a profitable endeavor. The 
electronics giant Siemens, for example, has 
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recently invested in a $2 billion microelectron-
ics research center near Dresden which is 
expected to create at least 4,500 new jobs. 
(Miller, p. 54) In Eisenach, General Motors-
Europe has purchased a state-run East German 
automobile factory which used to make a car 
known as the Wartburg. With $600 million in 
investment, GM turned the factory into a new 
Opel plant which is expected to raise produc-
tivity seven to eight percent annually for the 
next few years. Through a thorough interview-
ing process, the GM plant's new managers hired 
the best workers of the old company to anchor 
the production line. After having received 12 
weeks of training to increase their skills in qual-
ity, design, and product development, 2,000 
employees can now build a vehicle in less than 
20 hours while the average European plant 
needs 36 hours. (Miller, pp. 67 -68) 
Training has been one of the major focus-
es of investment in the newly-acquired busi-
nesses. During the privatization process, the 
German government and West German indus-
tries together helped initiate programs involv-
ing managerial cooperation and partnerships 
between companies in the East and the West. 
East German managers visited plants in the 
West to observe manufacturing techniques and 
to seek advice on such matters as marketing, 
packaging, technology, training, costs, and pric-
ing. Many managers and workers were sent to 
the West for official training and education, 
such as the Meister program which allowed the 
best workers to receive two years of full-time 
training to become foremen. In the West work-
ers were educated in electronics, standards, and 
quality control, while managers received cours-
es in business administration, marketing, data 
processing, accounting, and labor law. After 
their training was completed and they returned 
to their companies, many East German work-
ers and managers established similar training 
programs in the East. (Hitchens, pp. 64-68) 
Germany's effort to improve conditions in 
its Eastern half has led to some success. 
Unemployment has declined in the East to 13 
percent in October of 1995, while wages have 
reached a level which is 76 percent that of the 
West. (Cowell, p. B1) These signs provide hope 
for Germany that the East German workforce 
will soon reach a state of wage parity with the 
West, since six years ago East German wages 
were only 32 percent of those of the West. 
Other signs of a budding East German econo-
my are a GOP growth in 1994 in the East of 9 
percent, versus a growth of just over 2 percent 
in the West. There has been a 25 percent rise 
in the number of service-oriented businesses in 
the East. (Miller, p. 54) For some industries, 
such as the massive German chemical industry, 
productivity in the East is closing the gap so 
quickly that the Association of the German 
Chemical Industry (VCI) expects 1995 to be the 
last year for keeping separate statistics for the 
East and the West. (Layman, p. 17) 
One very serious problem which the new 
East German businesses faced was that the 
Western European market was saturated with 
many of the products which the East Germans 
had traditionally produced. Thus, they were 
forced to find new customers. This has result-
ed in the opening of new markets in areas of vital 
economic importance, such as the Asia-Pacific 
regions. In 1994 East Germany exports grew by 
25 percent. Combined with a 7 percent increase 
in the West, Germany seems certain to add to its 
already-strong export surplus. (Miller, p. 54) 
Future Objectives and Expectations 
for East Germany 
The causes of East Germany's low produc-
tivity can be grouped into three general cate-
gories: facilities , workers, and products. The 
facilities in East Germany included aging facto-
ries and plants filled with outdated machinery 
and surrounded by an insufficient infrastruc-
ture. Investment in factories and infrastructure 
is thought to have raised productivity nearly 30 
percent. There are still improvements which 
must be made in the way of facilities, however, 
especially in repairing the environmental dam-
age caused by the over-industrialization of pre-
unification East Germany. 
Given the proper equipment and the incen-
tive to work, East German workers have the 
· potential to be very productive. The knowledge 
that their incomes and even their employment 
depends on the quality of their work should cer-
tainly give East Germans sufficient incentive. It 
is now important that the government provide 
them with educational and research opportuni-
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ties. Dedication to R&D investment will help 
East German companies progress into those 
high-tech markets which have not yet been sat-
urated by West German competitors. 
Most of the consumer products made by 
companies in the former CDR were considered 
to be inferior in Western markets. Prior to uni-
fication, East German producers did not give 
much consideration to international standards, 
aesthetics, and user-friendliness. Most of these 
products are now being replaced by ones which 
are more appealing. It is important that pro-
ducers be able to efficiently adapt their work-
forces and processes to the new standards. The 
influx of Western technologies, better materi-
als, and new equipment should significantly 
improve the durability and reliability of these 
items. The application of design and safety 
standards, such as improved tolerances on 
mechanical items and hygiene requirements on 
food and pharmaceuticals, should also improve 
product quality. However, even after such adap-
tations are made, it will take time for East 
European producers to build a reputation for 
making quality products. 
Conclusions 
Through an enormous amount of invest-
ment by the German government and by pri-
vate firms and entrepreneurs, East German 
companies now have fairly modern facilities in 
an environment more conducive to efficient 
production. The workforce is better trained and 
educated, and while there is still a gap in pro-
ductivity, it is closing fast. 
Even after East German companies bring 
their productivity to the level of West Germany, 
they will still have to contend with the same 
problems now facing established West German 
firms. These include the slow growth of the 
German economy, the powerful national labor 
unions , the heavy legal restrictions of the 
German government, and the high taxes which 
support the country's social welfare net. If the 
new firms do not encourage innovation or 
devote enough resources to research, they, like 
their West German counterparts, will fall 
behind in important new technology areas. 
In the coming decades, East Germany's 
economic transition and recovery will serve as 
a benchmark for other nations in similar situ-
ations. Some of these nations include other for-
mer-communist countries struggling to adapt 
to a market economy such as the former Soviet 
Union and other former members of the Eastern 
Bloc, as well as communist nations such as 
China and Vietnam, which are slowly opening 
to elements of capitalism. Potential foreign 
investors in these countries may well look to the 
successes and failures of German reunification 
to guide them in their decisions to invest. 
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